

He was a German and in peace-time was owner of a glove factory in Erfurt. Oberleutnant ZIEGLER, on the other hand, was a German professional soldier. Prominent also was HUNTERMAN & HUNTER known in the office as "the Englishman". This man, who was a shipping agent on the West Coast of Africa before the war, appears to have directed the activities of a certain KUPF and VAN VLIET and to have controlled the working of the transmitters dropped in Holland which came under Abwehr control, of which wireless links there were a number; in all ten different lines were maintained on this traffic and were kept up for approximately eighteen months, being finally closed down in February 1944. Under HUNTERMAN were a number of characters who worked outside the office and performed the actual task of making contact with members of resistance with a view to penetrating the organizations for which they were working. The principal among these were VAN VLIET, a Dutchman, and ARNAUD, a German who appears to masquerade as a Dane and who had worked for the Abwehr since 1939. Posing as a member of the Underground Movement, VAN VLIET, who appears to be the principal penetration agent, managed to trace a number of W/T agents and the Germans were always very quick to turn them round. Abteilung IIIF could count on a substantial number of other individuals who were prepared to perform similar functions.

Evidence that S.O.E. Organisation was under control at an early date.

The history of the agents who were sent to the field from England to establish the secret army illustrates the methods adopted by Abteilung IIIF and shows that the enemy were not merely successful in frustrating the enterprise but in disguising their successes and turning it to their advantage. JOHANNES arrived in Holland in June 1942 and there are indications that he never operated except under the control of the Germans. Whether this is correct or not, the organization was under control by the beginning of November of the same year. Although suspicion was aroused in London that all was not well in July 1943 when, after consideration the conclusion was reached that JOHANNES's successor, KALE, was in danger, it was not until later that S.O.E. had any serious doubts regarding the organization as a whole. In fact the organization was certainly under German control from the end of 1942; was most probably under control from the summer of that year (possibly August 1942) and it is very likely that it never operated at all except under control and that the Germans captured JOHANNES on or shortly after his arrival.

JOHANNES was dropped in June 1942 when the "Plan for Holland" was set in motion. He was followed by another S.O.E. agent, a certain BROADEMAN, who arrived in the field in February 1943, being dropped to a reception committee arranged by the agent FARSHIP. BROADEMAN, who was identical with a man called FRANK, and two other agents, one of whom was recruited locally in the field, were arrested and worked for the Germans as double agents. After they had worked in this way for a few months a message was received from England congratulating them on the good work they had done and instructing them to return, and the steps taken by the Germans to deal with this situation are interesting. It is certain that at some date BROADEMAN did come under control, and if he came under control on arrival in the field, as appears probable or at least possible, the task of the Germans must have been fairly simple.

An examination of the facts which are set out hereafter supports the view that IIIF were in control at a very early date and that the month of August 1942 would not be very wide of the mark. We also have the evidence of the agent CHIVE, who was arrested by the Germans on making his descent in Holland at the end of November 1942 and who was then sent to a concentration camp.

The interrogation of CHIVE when he ultimately escaped and returned to this country made it abundantly clear that at least by the end of 1942 the whole organisation was hopelessly penetrated.

History of S.O.E. Activities and Abwehr Counter Activities.

From the outset it had been intended that JOHANNES should return to the U.K. and report after a few months in the field and on the 24th September 1942 KALE was sent to relieve him together with a W/T operator named CUCUMBER. During the next few months some ten organiser instructors or W/T operators arrived in Holland. The control by the Germans of the organiser JOHANNES or of his substitute KALE, whose mission was similar to that of JOHANNES and comprised the organisation of the secret army, involved the control or potential control of the whole of that secret army; and it appears that these men must all have fallen into enemy hands. The recall of JOHANNES did, however, inevitably present a problem which was repeated on more than one occasion and to which on separate occasions Abteilung III F found different answers: JOHANNES was notionally shot while resisting arrest on 8th November 1942 and his death was reported to S.O.E. on the CUCUMBER W/T set. This date has hitherto been accepted in London as being the actual date of CUCUMBER's arrest. There is, however, no reason at all to think that this view is correct. What is probable is that if JOHANNES was arrested at this date, and his arrest cannot have been later than that, JOHANNES gave away everything he knew: which must have been everything about the secret army including the identity of KALE. It is hard to understand how the presumed death of JOHANNES could have been accepted in London without question who, had he been arrested instead of being killed it must have been obvious that it was quite hopeless to endeavour to continue the undertaking which he had launched and of which he was the chief organiser, since to act upon the footing that a captured agent has not been broken is to court, not merely peril to all concerned, but disaster to the whole enterprise.

Thereafter the duties conferred upon JOHANNES by S.O.E. and the part assigned to him by the Abwehr were carried out in the name of KALE. Upwards of twenty-five receptions were arranged over KALE's W/T set and contact was maintained with London through CUCUMBER set down to the middle of July 1943.

In the meantime, however, the Abwehr had been presented with a further problem of a similar kind to that which had been dealt with on the recall of JOHANNES. In consequence of JOHANNES' disappearance KALE was asked by S.O.E. to send to England some other person thoroughly well-informed about the progress of the secret organisation. In the face of this requirement the Abwehr decided to go through all the motions of supplying such a person. On the one hand this would serve the purpose of allaying any suspicion which might be felt in London regarding the security of the S.O.E. organisation and on the other hand S.O.E. could be made to disclose to the Germans, through CUCUMBER, the methods by which agents could be evacuated from Europe.

On 14.3.43 S.O.E. were informed that KALE would send his chief assistant, who was called ANTON. When asked for full particulars of ANTON the reply was that ANTON was Nicolaas de WILDE, Charlotte de Bourbonstrasse 226, The Hague, born 5.10.03. The Germans perhaps made an error and took a risk in giving these particulars regarding ANTON. In fact no such person as Nicolaas de WILDE lived at 226 Charlotte de Bourbonstrasse and steps had been taken to guard against the risk of any one being sent to contact him at that address. Arrangements had been

made by KRISCHWITZER and KUPF whereby if any one should call at that address, he should be told that de WILGE was away but would return in a few days. There is, in fact, a man called de WILGE working for ABTEILUNG III who was born about 1903; and when the necessity arose he would, and perhaps did, play the part of ANTON. And when S.O.E. decided to arrange for ANTON's evacuation through Belgium and Holland some one was found by the Germans to fill this part, and he left Holland about 12.5.43 and travelled to Paris. We do not know the details of the arrangements nor the route he took except that BROADBENT was told to carry out the evacuation and it is apparent that that route and those who operated became known to the Germans. We know that the spurious ANTON was accompanied by a certain ARNAUD who has been an Abteilung III agent since 1940 and who we also know was regarded by S.O.E. as a pensioner of theirs having been notified to them by BROADBENT's W/T operator (the German controlled set GOLF) as BROADBENT's best helper.

On arrival in Paris ARNAUD and ANTON made contact, in accordance with directions given by S.O.E. to BROADBENT, with another agent, MARCEL by name. It was impossible to evacuate the party that moon and they had to wait a month. ARNAUD and ANTON returned to Brussels for that purpose - a step which to the uninitiated appears unusual - and on return to Paris they met the S.O.E. agent, MARCEL, by appointment in a cafe. We know from MARCEL who subsequently arrived in this country that so soon as he had sat down in the cafe with the others, three German soldiers came in and started to examine the cards of those at the back of the cafe. ANTON got up and walked out. ARNAUD said "They have arrested ANTON". MARCEL looked out and saw ANTON crossing the road in company with a man in civilian clothes. Such was the account, given by MARCEL when he arrived in this country, of ANTON's disappearance. A great deal of trouble was taken to decide whether ANTON had been arrested because he had been followed or whether it was sheer bad luck as a result of a snap check of identity cards. A great deal of trouble was taken to assess the dangers which would fall upon the organization as a result of this arrest, regard being had to the fact that ANTON, according to MARCEL, had been carrying compromising papers. It never occurred to any one that ANTON was nothing but a German agent, and that ARNAUD was lying when he said that ANTON had been arrested. ARNAUD's stock inevitably rose in the eyes of London and MARCEL was sent back to the continent to fall into enemy hands. The problem raised by S.O.E.'s request for the sending to England of a man who was well acquainted with the secret army had been answered by the Abwehr with conspicuous success. So far were we baffled by this German trick and so far were we from understanding the nature of the game that was being played and the high stakes involved, that in commenting on the arrest an investigator remarked "If the Germans had known beforehand of this rendezvous it is hard to believe they would not have arrested MARCEL and ARNAUD."

Indeed so great had been the success of the Germans in carrying out this ruse that it may well have encouraged them to carry out an even more important and daring transaction. On this occasion the request of S.O.E. for sending to this country of another man who had full knowledge of the secret army was anticipated by the Germans themselves who offered to send a man in close touch with the O.D. Furthermore on occasion instead of choosing a fictitious individual or an individual who on arrival here might be shown up as a German agent, there was chosen for the part a man against whom nothing adverse could be known in London and who believed himself to be, and was in fact, a bona fide patriot: a man, KNOPFER by name,

those case when he arrived in England aroused a great deal of interest and no little perturbation in our minds. KNOPPER had been approached at the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943 by the Abteilung III agent, VAN VLIET, who is referred to in the early part of this note. KNOPPER had been doing some resistance work and had been in contact with a certain Colonel KOPPERT, whom VAN VLIET, representing himself as a member of resistance, asked him if he might use KNOPPER's address as a boîte-sous-léttre. Thereafter KNOPPER continued to see VAN VLIET regularly about once a week until he finally left Holland. VAN VLIET on his first approach, claimed to be working for a General MINIKU and stated that he had been commissioned by the General to find out all he could about the requirements of secret organisations in Holland. He was in possession of what he alleged were forged documents purporting to have been issued by the Gestapo on production of which he obtained frontier passes enabling him to travel between Holland and Belgium on behalf of the General. He asked KNOPPER to assist him in this work and to obtain as much information as he could regarding secret organisations to hand over to the General. This KNOPPER agreed to do and got in touch with several organisations for this purpose. On 20th July 1943 VAN VLIET asked KNOPPER, who had by then collected quite a volume of information and passed it to VAN VLIET, if he would travel to England and would return with instructions for these resistance organisations. As KNOPPER understood it the idea was that several resistance movements needed co-ordination and central direction and official recognition and support from London. This could be best obtained by sending an emissary from Holland and securing his return as a liaison officer with London credentials. The merit of such a journey from the point of view of the Germans do not need stressing. In order to facilitate KNOPPER's journey Abteilung III had already, through the instrumentality of BROADBEAN's W/T set, made contact with London on the subject; and on 5.6.43 a message had been sent to London purporting to come from the agent BROADBEAN via another agent, GOLP, stating that the sender had come into contact with Colonel KOPPERT, a leading man of the O.E. He wished urgently to send over his best man for a few weeks. It was suggested further that he should be sent over with the spurious ANTON DE WILCK. S.O.E. immediately gave their approval, ordered BROADBEAN to make the arrangements for the journey and advised him that the new man (KNOPPER) should not come with ANTON DE WILCK but should be ready to leave alone in about 4 weeks. S.O.E. would give further instructions. The Germans allowed almost precisely one month to pass before sending a message ostensibly from GOLP giving KNOPPER's cover name and stating that he urgently required to leave as soon as possible. In reply BROADBEAN was given a password and an address to which KNOPPER was to call. A week later on 13th July KNOPPER had a meeting with VAN VLIET at Breda, where he was handed over to a so-called police inspector who took him to Turnout where they again met VAN VLIET who in turn took KNOPPER to a flat in Brussels. Two days later a new passecour turned up in the person of HOLLEVOET (who is possibly identical with a character of that name known to have been working on behalf of Abteilung II of Brussels in passing German agents to Paris en route for this country). HOLLEVOET took VAN VLIET and KNOPPER to Jeumont where KNOPPER was handed over to ARNAUD while VAN VLIET and HOLLEVOET returned to Brussels. KNOPPER was held up in Paris for some weeks and was then brought by S.O.E. channels over the Pyrenees to Spain. For the purpose of facilitating KNOPPER's mission, and also no doubt in order to build up ARNAUD, KNOPPER was provided with documents purporting to come from resistance circles. These comprised of a note to the Dutch or English authorities concerned, suggesting the desirability of establishing an escape route over which important Dutch intellectuals, industrialists and officials in Holland who, without themselves acting

in a such manner, had assisted in the sabotage of the German war effort, might be got out of Holland: not necessarily to England but to some neutral country. For this purpose it was suggested information should be obtained from ARNAUD "who you know as the chief pressur for Belgium". There was also included a memorandum regarding resistance in Holland which made general statements about loyalist activities in Holland but no specific information of any kind.

The German object in sending KNOPPERE to this country was defeated, not because of any inherent defect, but because of what, from their point of view, was an unfortunate accident. Unfavourable, and possibly incorrect, reports had been received by the Dutch in London regarding Colonel KOPPERT. KNOPPERE's contact with Colonel KOPPERT accordingly made him, to a limited extent, suspect. The fact that the message from BROADBENT stated that KNOPPERE was KOPPERT's right-hand man, though incorrect in fact, further prejudiced KNOPPERE in the eyes of those who had to interrogate him. KNOPPERE being suspect was not allowed to return to Holland; and then when investigation was still proceeding, information, which had been in possession of S.I.C. for many months but which had not been distributed by them and which showed VAN VLIET to be, if not a German agent, at least highly suspect was brought to our notice. We came to the conclusion that KNOPPERE had been planted on S.O.E. by van VLIET and that BROADBENT was working under German control. ARNAUD, however, escaped suspicion and the suggestion that the S.O.E. escape route from Paris onwards might have been blown was not accepted.

There are two points in connection with this enterprise to which it may be worth calling attention as indicating the fallibility of Abteilung IIIA. In the first place, when KNOPPERE came to be interrogated, there was an inconsistency between his story of the origin of his mission and the account which BROADBENT had given of him as right-hand man of Colonel KOPPERT. In the second place the timing was bad. The proposition put forward by BROADBENT for the sending of KNOPPERE to this country was first put forward on 5.5.43, whereas KNOPPERE stated that it was not until the 20th of that month that he had been asked to come to England; and then of course not by Colonel KOPPERT but by VAN VLIET. It is curious to find these two mistakes being made, but the fact that they were made, may have prevented us from spotting the fact earlier that the whole arrangement had been made by the Germans. It could hardly be supposed, if the venture was being controlled by the Germans from above, that such clumsy mistakes could have been made.

KNOPPERE's visit was a rebuff for the Germans. Further difficulties followed. ANTON had been intended to come here to report on the progress of the secret army. ANTON had been "arrested" and S.O.E. never accepted KNOPPERE, who knew nothing of the secret army, as a substitute. According to TALE, who was supposed to be in charge, one STEAK recruited in the field, had taken ANTON's place as second-in-command. S.O.E. determined to get STEAK over here and on 31.7.43 BROADBENT, who was supposed to be in charge of evacuation, was told to bring out STEAK together with the agent PUMKIN. He himself was to come with PUMKIN. Before any further steps had been taken BROADBENT was also instructed by London to send FENNIS out with STEAK. BROADBENT, PUMKIN and FENNIS were at this time either interested or under control and we have only the word of the Germans that there was ever such a person as STEAK. The Germans were therefore placed in the position of having either to make excuses for the failure of BROADBENT to obey these instructions, an almost impossible task; to arrange the "arrest" of the four men concerned in circumstances which would inevitably suggest that the

S.O.E. Organisation had been blown: or to adopt some other and more subtle course. In fact they adopted a technique similar to that adopted when ASTON was called to London but carried it to a further extreme. Four substitutes, agents of Abteilungs IIIF, were provided for the four S.O.E. agents. They were DAMEY, HARGES, an unknown Frenchman, and one DE VILLES, who was probably the man who had played a similar role when a substitute had to be found for ASTON. Three of the four men were taken by KISCHUTSKY by train to Paris where they met the fourth man. There they were handed over to ARNAUD with instructions to find out by what route they would be evacuated from France. ARNAUD handed them over to a member of the VIC escape organisation and the four men, after being handled by a number of members of this organisation, were taken to Perpignan staying at VIC safe houses en route. The last stage of the journey was in a lorry across the frontier. Before they reached the frontier HARGES and DAMEY jumped off. A little later the Frenchman jumped off and hailed a car belonging to the Feldgendarmarie showing his papers. He made this car follow the lorry and in due course the driver was arrested. The four German agents returned to Paris and made their reports to ARNAUD. Subsequently S.O.E. were informed by a member of the VIC organisation that the four agents had been arrested in the Pyrenees while attempting to escape. This was accepted as a sufficient explanation of the failure of this, the third attempt, to bring to England some one who was fully informed regarding the organisation of the secret army.

The suspicion engendered by KNOPFERS' connection with Colonel KOPPERT prompted S.O.E. to enquire of BROACSBAN whether he knew KOPPERT or VAN VLIET. The Germans gave a reassuring reply stating that VAN VLIET was only known to KOPPERT from conversations regarding KNOPFERS' journey but that VAN VLIET was a collaborator of ARNAUD. On November 7th 1943 following information which had been received from S.I.S. to that effect, GOLF was informed that VAN VLIET was an enemy agent; a statement which GOLF roundly repudiated stating that these suspicions were unfounded, that VAN VLIET was a great patriot etc.

VAN VLIET had indeed, with the knowledge of S.O.E., become so well informed regarding the S.O.E. organisation that it would have been, from the German point of view, fatal if he became known to us as a German agent; and it must be assumed that it was in face of the suspicions that had been aroused in London that the Germans determined to take steps to rehabilitate VAN VLIET. It so happened that the S.O.E. agent APOLLO landed by mistake in Belgium on 18.10.43 when the aircraft which should have dropped him, together with BOUTIN, in Holland was shot down. APOLLO reached the contact address which had been given to him in Brussels, which was none other than the address of a safe house of VAN VLIET, Mee KRIEKS; he was there duly visited by VAN VLIET. VAN VLIET successfully played the part of a patriot and one can only suppose that APOLLO knew nothing of the business of KNOPFERS before he left for the field. APOLLO was fortunate in the part which the Germans designed for him in that his arrival offered them the opportunity of building up VAN VLIET by assisting his return to this country. On 6.11.43 APOLLO was taken to Paris by ARNAUD. The two men stayed in VIC safe houses and were both taken to Lyons by the VIC courier JEANNE. There they met VIC's second in command and ARNAUD returned to Paris, APOLLO travelling to Spain. APOLLO brought a tolerably good account of VAN VLIET and recounted it on his arrival here. At almost the same moment a further opportunity arose to carry out a dealer trick. The night after APOLLO came down, Lt. John Kennard HURST, a U.S.A. airman, made a forced landing in Holland. A boy took him to a house and he was passed on by unknown individuals and eventually taken to a bookshop in Doorn where he met one DORO who claimed to

be a Dutch officer. SOLO told HURST that he had been in the U.K. for three years and had recently returned by parachute. He had gone to an address in Brussels, where he had been contacted by VAN VLIET. SOLO introduced HURST in Deere to a man who sent him to Tilburg. At Tilburg a uniformed policeman took him to the frontier on a motor bicycle and then, after changing into civilian clothes in a wood, the man took him, travelling on bicycles which had been hidden for them in the wood, across the frontier to Turnhout. There HURST was met by VAN VLIET who escorted him to Brussels and established him at the safe house of Moe WINTERS. On 25.11.43 HURST was picked up by Louis DESRAY and taken to Charleroi. DESRAY bribed the guards on the Belgian frontier and the two men crossed on foot near Jemont. There HURST was given a false identity card by a woman and then, still with DESRAY, taken to a railway junction (Aulnoy?) where they were met by ARNAUD who took HURST to Paris. In Paris HURST was put up and then taken by the VIO valet, JEANNE, to Lyons.

The escape from the German concentration camp in which the S.O.E. agents captured in Holland were interned of the agents CHIVE and SPRUIT in August 1943 made it impossible for the Germans to continue with their deception unless these men could be recaptured. Both men were fully aware of the true facts, both from the terms of their interrogation by the Germans and from their conversations with other captured agents. Furthermore CHIVE had a transmitter which the Germans had been playing back. No doubt in the hope that CHIVE and SPRUIT would not succeed in leaving occupied territory, the Germans proceeded upon that footing and in fact continued to transmit on the CHIVE transmitter down to February 1944. CHIVE and SPRUIT did, however, actually reach this country in February 1944 and at some stage the Germans became aware of this.

HUSTERMAN who was in charge of all the German-controlled S.O.E. W/T sets, continued to play them all back until February 1944 and then closed the traffic by a message on all lines addressed to two S.O.E. officers by what in fact was their correct names, thanking them for their long mutual co-operation and promising them that if they came to the continent they would be received with the same care as their agents; this course was adopted because HUSTERMAN thought that his false play must have been known to England since November 1943 because of the two agents who had escaped then.

Comment.

In putting the above story together some consideration has inevitably been given to the question how far, what appears to have been a series of disasters, could have been avoided from the London end. The story is a fair illustration of the fact which is sometimes forgotten, that counter-espionage is very much easier than espionage, and that an espionage organisation in enemy-occupied territory is extremely vulnerable to penetration. If that penetration is skilfully done it can remain undiscovered for a long period. These are inevitable risks. Moreover espionage and sabotage do doubt require a habit of mind in those who direct them which must disregard the individual and, if the target is sufficiently important, must count casualties as a matter of insignificance. Risks must be run. The suggestions put forward are not designed, so to speak, to strike a balance between ruthless action on the one hand and faltering timidity and indecision on the other; but to ensure so far as possible that enterprises such as that which was set afoot in Holland are not defeated by lack of reasonable precautions.

What strikes one first is that the vulnerability of the organisation in Holland was apparently not appreciated; secondly

that the probable and possible implications of minor mishaps upon the security of the organization as a whole were not considered and thirdly that no steps were ever taken by means of trick questions or otherwise to find out whether the operators were or were not under control. With the exception of very few messages containing both true and bluff checks the traffic from the field relating to the execution of KNOPPER (GOLF and BROOKMAN) only contains bluff checks. Now, although the use of a true check ought not to be taken as evidence that an agent is operating freely, persistent absence of the true check might, at least, raise the presumption that the agent is under control. This inference was never drawn. Incidentally it says much for the quality of the agents sent to the field that they did not apparently divulge their true checks to the Germans. Experiences of combatting German espionage activities in this country has taught us that an agent's controller is always most unwilling to believe that his agent has been blown or has betrayed him and this may lie at the root of the failure to appreciate the true significance of the absence of signals showing the agents were operating freely. Consideration should also have been given to the possibility of JOHNSON not having been killed at once or to his having given something away to the Germans, this if only because any information which the Germans might have gained from him might easily have necessitated the abandoning of the whole enterprise, not because it was dangerous and involved risks but simply because it was foredoomed to failure.

Not only, however, does there appear to have been a failure to look the facts squarely in the face but also a failure when suspicion had once been aroused to test those suspicions. It would not have been difficult to have put a few trick questions in the traffic with a view to seeing whether the reaction was that which would be expected if the agent was not under control. In this connection it is worthy of notice that we knew that some of the W/T operators who had been captured did not themselves operate on behalf of the Germans, their sets being taken over by the Germans for that purpose. No trick questions, however, seem ever to have been put even to the agents who were under suspicion.

Had the whole of the W/T traffic been under constant review in the light of all the known facts; had trick questions been put to the agents; had each mishap been examined with a view to appreciating its possible implications on the position of the others and the organization as a whole; above all had a record been kept which set out in chronological order all the known facts regarding the enterprise and the sources from which such facts were known; a record which would have been readily available for consultation in considering all the above matters; had all this been done then there is little doubt that the B.O.E. organization in Holland would not have met the fate which overtook it.

If it were possible there would be much to be said for an officer familiar with the difficulties of running a controlled transmitter to be sitting alongside those who were in contact with a W/T operator in the field. Short of that it is suggested that the traffic could be examined by such an officer from time to time. In any event it is submitted that it should be the primary duty of some officer to examine and keep under constant observation all the happenings in the field, as well as the mishaps, with a view to satisfying himself as to the true security position and advising those responsible for the offensive accordingly. These precautions would, however, be of little avail in the absence of a record or records in the form of a journal setting out all the known facts regarding the

organisation in the field as a whole and the characters taking part in the activities. The need for this is clearly illustrated by the case of ARNAUD who was accepted as an S.O.E. passeur in the absence of any record which set out all that was known of ARNAUD and the circumstances of his recruitment: the fact that ARNAUD was one of the lynch-pins of the Abteilung IIIF penetration sufficiently illustrates the point.

DUTCH INVESTIGATION REPORT

A. INTRODUCTORY

1. In accordance with the directions contained in your ADP/24/O/643, I have now conducted the enquiry there defined, and, having reached the point at which no further investigation based upon material at present available in this country is likely to reach a more certain conclusion before the two Agents mentioned below have returned, I am making my preliminary report.

2. It is impossible either to assess the extent of the Enemy's penetration, or to form any conclusion as to its occasion or cause, without a detailed and comprehensive survey of the Operations of the Dutch Section during 1942 and 1943. For the sake of clarity, therefore, I have divided this Report into three parts:-

- A. Introductory.
- B. Survey of Operations during 1942 & 1943.
- C. Conclusions;
and six Appendices:-

Appendix I. Diagram of Dropping Operations, showing only those Operations in which Agents were dropped.

Appendix II. Table of Distribution of Agents in the Field.

Appendix III. List of Real names and Pseudonyms of all Agents concerned.

Appendix IV. Summary of the facts relating to ANTON de WILDE.

Appendix V. Summary of the facts relating to SPINACH.

Appendix VI. Interrogation of SERGEANT.

Throughout this Report, Agents are referred to by their operational pseudonyms.

3. The material upon which the facts contained in this Report are based is as follows:-

Series of Class B. messages from Berne.

Operational and record files of the Dutch Section.

C.E. files - DE WILDE and BILL and THE O.D.;
SERGEANT.

Verbal information provided by Dutch Section Officers.

4. I have received great assistance and the closest co-operation from Major Bingham and his staff. The Section records have recently been overhauled and a great deal of work has been done towards arranging them in proper sequence; but there still

are a number of gaps which I have found it impossible to bridge. For this reason and for the reason that the Enemy controlled traffic has been so skilfully worked that no one in S.O.E. could, without extraneous information, have detected the deception, many details of fact are still obscure, and any conclusions drawn from them must be regarded as provisional until the return of the two Agents, and accepted only with the greatest reserve. I feel able, however, to draw conclusions upon the material at present available, and these are contained in Part C. of this Report.

5. The two Agents from whom the information necessitating this investigation was received are -

<u>Operational Name</u>	<u>Real Name</u>	<u>Alias</u>	<u>Field Name</u>	<u>To whom, with & when dropped</u>
CHIVE	Lt. Johan Bernard UEBERK	UDEMA	LOUIS	LETTUCE 29. IX. 42 with GRESS
SPROUT	Sgt. Peter DOUBLEIN	DIEFFEN-BROCK	PAUL	MARROW 9. III. 43. with KOHLGABI and BEAVALS.

6. There appears to be no doubt that these two Agents have in fact arrived in Switzerland, and in my view one must, for the purpose of this Report, accept the information given by them to the Dutch Information Bureau as correct.

They state as follows. -

- a) CHIVE was dropped near Amerongen to a "LETTUCE" Reception Committee on 29. XI. 42. He was immediately arrested, the Committee consisting of quislings, who handcuffed him and handed him over to the German S.D. He was taken to the Hague for interrogation lasting three days, and was then put into Haarlem Concentration Camp.
- b) SPROUT was dropped near Ensolo on 9. III. 43 to a "MARROW" Reception Committee. He had a similar experience, except that he was taken to Driebergen for interrogation lasting for over three weeks, and then was sent to Haarlem.
- c) Both assert that the interrogators knew their Field names (LOUIS and PAUL) and were extremely well informed on S.O.E. Schools, H.Q. and personnel, and repeatedly stated that they got their information "from inside".
- d) They also state that in November 1942 there were about 100 "British" Agents in the Camp, and that the number has now risen to about 130.
- e) Between them they identified the following S.O.E. Agents in the Camp. -

<u>Operational Name</u>	<u>Real Name</u>	<u>Field Name</u>	<u>To whom, with and when dropped</u>
GOLF	de WILDE	DOLF, KRIS	PARENTIN with BROADBEAN 18. II. 43
TENNIS	de WILDE	NOL	MARROW with ROCKET 18. II. 43

<u>Operational Name</u>	<u>Real Name</u>	<u>Field Name</u>	<u>To whom, with and when dropped.</u>
BROCCOLI	MUNTERS	PRINS	TURNIP with MUSTARD 28. XI. 42
TRIMFET	VULKAAN	RAN	BLIND with LETTUCE 28. XI. 42
EBENEZER	LAWIERS	EBENEZER	BLIND with CATARH
CHOQUET	de RUY	THRO	MARROW with POND & SQUASH 22. V. 43
PARSLY A.	Lt. Kien BRUGAAR	BERT CHALFONT HELPER Mr. GROENEVELD	CATARH with RADISH 16. II. 43
ENDIVE	Sgt. Klean van de BOR	HUIB	TURNIP 16. II. 43
ROCKY	Lt. Jan KIST	WALT Mr. BEUINEMA	MARROW with TERNIS 18. II. 43.

f) They further report that "all were caught similarly": I think that this cannot be taken as meaning that all were caught immediately on landing, for EBENEZER and TRIMFET both jumped blind, and I am satisfied that each of them with his Organiser (CATARH and LETTUCE respectively) worked for some time in the Field before being caught.

g) LOUIS and PAUL escaped from Hamren on 29th August 1943, and arrived in Switzerland on 19th November 1943; they are now on their way to the U.K.

7. A vital factor is the precise date on which each of these Agents first appeared in the Camp, and this cannot be ascertained until LOUIS and PAUL have returned. But accepting their story of their own capture as true, it must I think be assumed that:

- i) The Agents who went with them to the same Committees were also at once arrested.
- ii) All Agents who went subsequently to the same Committees suffered a like fate.

These considerations permit the very latest date at which a Reception Committee, and therefore its Organiser, was still at liberty to be fixed, and also the minimum number of Agents and their names who must have been under arrest from the moment they arrived in the Field.

8. There is, however, a further consideration which is of great value. Nearly all the wireless traffic has continued right up to the present time; if, therefore, one finds in any given set of traffic the mention of the name of an Agent who is now known to have been then under arrest, the particular

- 4 -

Wireless Operator must then also have been in Enemy hands, and probably also his Organizer. Further the failure to mention the arrest of such an Agent, which arrest must have been known to the Wireless Operator, or his Organizer, had they been free, is I think strong evidence that he or they were then under control.

9. It is mainly upon these considerations that I have based my conclusions in Part C.

B. SURVEY OF DUTCH OPERATIONS DURING 1942/1943.

1. Until the middle of the year 1942 the Agents despatched to Holland had been Sabotage or Propaganda Organisers. I have seen no records of Operations prior to November 1941, and, in any event, these are not material to this investigation. Between November 1941 and June 1942 seven important and independent Sabotage Organisers were despatched to the Field all of whom, but one, were dropped blind. They were:

- | | | |
|----|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. | CATARRH
(W/Op: EMBERSZEE) | } 8.XI.41. |
| 2. | LETTUCE
(W/Op: TRUMPET) | } 28.III.42. |
| 3. | TURNIP
(W/Op: SWEDE (?)) | } 28.III.42. |
| 4. | LEEK
(W/Op: HUSK) | } 5.IV.42 |
| 5. | CARROT | 27.II.42 |
| 6. | POTATO (by sea route)
(Organiser of Dutch
end of ferry service
U.K./Holland) | 19.IV.42 |
| 7. | PARSNIP
(W/Op: SPINACH) | 22.VI.42 dropped to
LETTUCE. |

Of these CATARRH, LETTUCE, TURNIP and PARSNIP all formed independent Reception Committees to whom other Agents were subsequently dropped: LEEK formed an independent Reception Committee to which he received containers only, but LACROSSE was sent to him via CATARRH on 22.IV.43, CARROT and POTATO had no receptions; the former returned to the U.K. on 2.IX.43, having accomplished nothing. He was interrogated at Bayswater. The only part of his story which is of interest to the present investigation is that he was instructed to contact TURNIP's wireless operator SWEDE (?), failing him TRUMPET, LETTUCE'S Wireless Operator, and failing him TURNIP himself. CARROT reports that SWEDE was killed on landing, TRUMPET failed to keep the rendezvous, and that, though TURNIP arrived at the rendezvous he was accompanied by a Gestapo agent. The date of this occurrence is uncertain, but it was probably in May 1942. CARROT left Holland in September 1942, and arrived back in the U.K. via Switzerland on 2 September 1943.

CARROT was not in my view a resourceful agent, nor was his recollection good, but he was, I think attempting to tell the truth, and I accept his information as, in the main outlines, accurate.

The TURNIP traffic, however, continued throughout the year 1942, and ultimately advised that TURNIP had died of disease on 5.XIII.42.

2. In the first half of the year 1942 it was decided by the

S. & E. Dutch Section and the D. & S. S. E. that contact should be established between them and a branch of a Dutch resistance organization known as "O.D. H. E. S." or "O.D. H. E. S." It is necessary to state that it is known of this organization before the negotiations to establish contact are commenced.

5. The O.D. appears to have been an organization developed sometime in 1941, with the object of forming a shadow government or administration of persons loyal to the Allied cause in Holland, who would take over the control of that country upon the expulsion or occupation of the German Forces. It does not appear that its initial form it was in order to carry on active resistance. Its constitution is extremely obscure and certainly amorphous, and it is doubtful whether it even carried the name "Organization" at all. Both Agents, S. & E. and S. & E., who were sent to the S. & E. to establish contact, reported adversely on the leaders, and upon their lack of unanimity and their insecurity.

In the early part of 1942, it was thought in this country that a Military Branch, the I. & S. E. this organization had been formed. I have been unable to ascertain upon what evidence this view was based, and have grave doubts whether such a Branch ever existed.

4. A very large volume of traffic has, however, emanated from the O.D. or from another Organization in contact with it. The circumstances in which this traffic originated and was collected, and its contents, are peculiarly within the knowledge of S. & E. who have given S. & E. very little information about it. As far as is known to S. & E. the channels of communication appear to be as follows:

(a) The Northern Route - Courier.

This was started by an old gentleman named [redacted] who in autumn 1942 organized a courier service from Holland to Stockholm by two vessels sailing regularly between Holland and the Baltic. He recruited a Dr. SWAANTJE as his intermediary at Delft. The courier was collected by the S. & E. Netherlands Consulate General at Stockholm, and was at first passed via the [redacted] Prime Minister to Gen. de Boer, of the Dutch S. & E. Since the beginning of this year, however, all [redacted] information from this source has gone direct to Major S. & E., the head of the Dutch Intelligence Service.

Since its inception the volume of this traffic has swollen considerably with long reports and large numbers of microphotos. At one time the traffic was too large for the Dutch diplomatic bag, and the British bag was used for the overflow.

On the 30 July 1945, Major SWAANTJE verbally advised S. & E. Dutch Section that he had information by this courier that SWAANTJE and his Wireless Operator had been arrested, and that details of the North Sea Route were in enemy hands.

(b) The "O.D. Line" - Wireless Traffic

In March 1943 SWAANTJE started to transmit to the S. & E. by one of two sets which had been sent by S. & E. to Holland via Sweden, and which, according to information from S. & E. reached "the technical end of O.D." It has handled very heavy traffic, but I have no

knowledge of its contents.

5. It was the I.D. Branch of O.D. which the Dutch Authorities and S.O.E. Dutch Section decided to contact in the early part of 1942.

Accordingly on the 26.VI.42 MARRON and his Wireless Operator (same operational name) were dropped to a CATAPULT Reception Committee.

His mission was as follows:

(i) To contact the leaders of I.D. on a joint mission from the Dutch Government and S.O.E. H.Q.

(ii) After consultation with the leaders, to establish contact with O.D. District Members, and, as soon as personnel had been established in any area, to inform H.Q. so that trained Organiser-Instructors could be sent to that area. Such District was, upon such establishment, to be detached completely from the O.D. Organisation, and to be controlled direct from H.Q. in London only. For this purpose Holland was divided into 17 districts - see Appendix II.

This preparatory regional organisation was known as "Phase A". The planning of the active resistance on D date, originally known as "Phase B", was not progressed beyond the stage of contemplation, as sufficient information has not been received from Holland to enable detailed plans for direct military assistance to be formulated.

(iii) To organise three or four Reception Committees for stores.

MARRON himself had had no para-military training, and it was proposed to replace him as soon as he had carried out his mission by an Agent who had had such training. This Agent was KALE & Bill.

6. The policy of S.O.E. Dutch Section during these Operations involved two major points:

(a) That the Sabotage Groups should each be kept independent of the others and of the "Phase A" Group.

(b) That Agents should, whenever possible, be dropped in numbers of more than one and always to Reception Committees.

7. As to (a), while every effort was made to keep the Agents of any Group segregated from those of another Group while they were in the Field, it did not prove to be possible to arrange that each Reception Committee should only receive Agents belonging to its own Group. For instance CATAPULT (a Sabotage Organiser) received five Phase A Agents, and two Sabotage Agents belonging to Groups other than his own, LETTUCE (a Sabotage Organiser) received four Phase A Agents and TURNIP two; while PARSNIP (a Sabotage Organiser) received two Escape Route Agents. MARRON on the other hand received none but his own Agents.

This cross-reception was inevitable having regard to the relatively small area of Holland and the difficulty of finding suitable Reception Points. MARROW's mission entailed the despatch to him of a large number of Agents, all of which he could not possibly have received himself. The residue, therefore, had to be distributed among the Sabotage Reception Committees.

As to (b) both Major Alizard (then head of S.O.E. Dutch Section) and the R.E.O. were strongly in favour of Reception Committees chiefly on the ground of the morale of the outgoing Agents, and also because they considered that security was enhanced by an Agent having, immediately upon arrival, inhabitants of the country who could see him safely over the first critical days. The present head of the S.O.E. Dutch Section, Major Bingham, is, and has been in the past, opposed to Reception Committees, but he took over command of the Section in March 1943 with a heritage of this system which he could not immediately terminate. Since June 1943, however, the few Agents who have gone to Holland, have been dropped blind, and Major Bingham is determined to pursue this policy.

In the events as they have occurred, it has proved that Major Bingham was right, as the major factor in the wholesale penetration by the Enemy has probably been the system of Reception Committees, but it must be borne in mind that this system has proved successful in other countries such as France, Norway and Poland, and that the knowledge that an Agent is to be received by patriots, who can initiate him into his life in the Field, greatly enhances his morale.

8. MARROW Traffic

MARROW's first signal was sent L.VIII.42 five weeks after his arrival, which is a normal delay.

He himself received 9 Agents, Organiser-Instructors and W/Operators, up to the end of the year, the last being CUCUMBER A and B on 27.X.42, and two other Organiser-Instructors were sent to him via CATARH and LETTUCE respectively. In addition a Special Liaison Officer between the leaders of I.D. and the Dutch M.I. in London, PARSLEY, was sent via CATARH on 24.IX.42, but was killed on landing; and, most important of all, RAB his successor came via LETTUCE on the 24.IX.42.

During this period up to the end of October 1942 his traffic reported the following salient facts:

(i) L.VIII - That all the contact addresses given him in his Mission were unsuitable, and that he was therefore making other arrangements for PARSLEY.

(ii) 18.VIII - That the heads of O.D. had been arrested and the Organisation partly dissolved, that it was interspersed with informers and mostly blown.

(iii) 30.IX - That CAMELFLOWER had contacted him (he had arrived to LETTUCE 24.IX)

(iv) 17.X - That MANGOLD (arrived to CATARH 24.IX) had been entrusted with S. Gelderland.

(v) 22.X - That CELERY A, PUMPKIN and TOMATO A had all arrived safely (all sent to MARROW 21.X)

(vi) I.XI. - That CAULIFLOWER had now CELEST C (arrived to MARROW 24.X) as W/Operator.

(vii) 3.XI - That the following W/Operators had been distributed as follows:

Arrived to MARROW	24.X.42	TOMATO C	to	Groningen
" " "	27 X.42	CUCUMBER B	"	Drenthe
" " "	24.X.42	CELEST C	"	N.OverijsseL

(viii) 8.XI.42 - MARROW's last Signal - That he had no news of PARSLEY (A) (he was intended as W/Operator to PARSLEY and did not go to the Field till 16.II.43).

9. KALE

He arrived to LETTUCE with CAULIFLOWER 24.XI.42, and his Mission was to contact and ultimately replace MARROW. There is no direct evidence in the traffic of MARROW, KALE or CUCUMBER that KALE succeeded in making the contact, but I think it must be assumed that he did, otherwise he would surely have advised H.Q.

The whole of his traffic is of great importance, but it is best studied in two parts, the first during November and December 1942, the second during 1943.

KALE's first signal was that of 14.XI.42 via LETTUCE W/Operator THIMPET, and reported the arrest of MARROW and his W/Operator on 9 XI.42.

On 14 and 17.XI.42 he sent two other Signals via THIMPET advising that CAULIFLOWER was listening on his own set.

The next advice of this disaster was from CUCUMBER, also via THIMPET, on 19.XI.42, stating that MARROW and his W/Operator had been arrested and were both taken dead to the Mortuary.

The CUCUMBER traffic at this period then reported:

27.XI.42 - That the disaster was due to D/F, and that it was supposed that only the Signals sent on the day of the disaster were in Enemy hands.

L.XII. - In answer to a request from H.Q. for safe addresses for PARSLEY A and RADISH, the name of

J. de HEER @ BERLIN @ DENTIST
Pandaarts
ROCHUSSENSTRAAT 25
ROTTENDAM

was given.

Neither S.I.S. nor M.I.5 have any adverse trace of this man.

4.XII.- That the disaster happened on the 8.XI and that German D/F cars had been seen in the neighbourhood.

On 28.XI.42 BROCCOLI was dropped to TURNIP (stated by CARROT to have been accompanied by a Gestapo man in May 1942) for KALE: the first mention of his arrival however is in CUCUMBER 6.II.43 which advises that he is ready to start work.

10. Up to this point, i.e. December 1942, I think that the known facts point to KALE, CAULIFLOWER and CUCUMBER all being still at liberty, together with the three TOMATOs and CELESTs,

and MARGOLIN, with all of whom KALE was no doubt in contact.

But on 29.XI.42 the LETTUCE Reception Committee is known to have been in Enemy hands, because on that date CHIVE (with CRESS) went down to it and was immediately captured.

And on 14.I.43 CUCUMBER, or possibly KALE via CUCUMBER, made the following report by Signal that

CHIVE had been attached as W/Operator to CUCUMBER A.

CRESS (Instructor Organizer) had been assigned to S. Limburg.

HERCULE had been attached to PARCHIN in S. Limburg as W/Operator.

The mention of CHIVE and CRESS in this context, both of whom must have at the time been in the hands of the Enemy, shows that at this date the CUCUMBER set and almost certainly KALE himself were also in the hands of the Enemy.

11. On this basis it is reasonable to assume that after 14.I.43, any Agent mentioned as being in contact with KALE, in the KALE traffic (which thereafter continued via CUCUMBER B, TOMATO C, and HERCULE) was at that time in the hands of the Enemy, for, although the Enemy would in most cases by control of the traffic get advance notice of arrivals in the field, he would scarcely risk using in the controlled traffic the name of any Agent whom he had failed to arrest. Further it is known that SHEROUT who was dropped to MARROW on 9.III.43, was arrested on landing, and it is therefore to be assumed that his companions and all those who came subsequently to MARROW were immediately caught.

On this basis the following Agents must be assumed from the KALE Traffic to have been under arrest by at the latest the following dates:

		<u>When and to whom dropped</u>	
5.III.43	TOMATO B	MARROW	24.X.42
	CUCUMBER B	"	27.X.42
9.III.43	KORLEBY	"	9.III.43
	SHEROUT		
	SEAKALE		
1.IV.43	CHEERY C	"	24.X.42
5.IV.43	CHEERY A	"	21.X.42
	CHEERY B	"	24.X.42
3.IV.43	TERNIS	"	16.II.43
22.IV.43	GHEMIN	"	22.IV.43
	NETBALL		
6.V.43	BERADDEAN	PARENTIF	18.II.43
8.V.43	LACROSSE	CATARRH	22.IV.43
22.V.43	FOIS	MARROW	22.V.43
	ORONNET		
	SQUASH		

12. On the same basis, and from the CUCUMBER Traffic the following Agents appear to have been arrested by the following dates at the latest:

		When and to whom dropped	
29.XI.42	CHIVE DRESS	LETTUCE	29.XI.42
and consequently:			
	LETTUCE TRIANGLE	themselves.	
14.I.43	BROCCOLI	TURKIP	28.XI.42
10.II.43	CUCUMBER B	MARROW	27.X.42
	JELERY C	"	24.X.42
	TOMATO C	"	24.X.42
20.II.43	RADISH PARSLEY A	CATARRH	16.II.43
10.III.43	SEAKALE SPROUT KOHLSMART	MARROW	9.VII.43
(SPROUT known to have been caught on landing)			
20.VII.43	MANGOLD	MARROW	24.IX.42
2.VIII.43	PUMPKIN	"	21.X.42

13. Further confirmation is obtained from a study of the minor traffic of:

A. NETBALL who went with CHERKIN to MARROW on 22.IV.43 after SPROUT had been arrested on landing to a MARROW Committee.

His traffic, which must have been Enemy controlled from the outset, starts on 27.VI.43 and ends on 12.VII.43, it mentions as free Agents CUCUMBER B and MANGOLD.

B. CHIVE - known to have been arrested on landing to LETTUCE 29.XI.42.

His traffic, which must have been enemy controlled from the outset, starts on 15.I.43 and ends on 6.X.43; it mentions as free Agents DRESS, who must have been taken with him, MANGOLD, SPROUT known to have been arrested on landing, TOMATO A and CUCUMBER A.

14. This Phase A Traffic was extremely well managed; without the evidence of CHIVE and SPROUT there is nothing in it calculated to arouse suspicion. Indeed it contains some very curious features which are hard to explain on the basis that it was controlled by the Enemy at the times stated above. These features are,

(1) KALE

(a) In April 43 KALE sent a long series of signals through CUCUMBER C, TOMATO C and BROCCOLI, giving an excellent and detailed report on the Phase A Organisation. This Report gives the total strength at about 1250 instructed men, and divides the strength among the 17 Districts. It is in this Series that BROCCOLI spelt his Dutch key "prijs" in the German form of "preis".

In May KALE made an adverse report on the G.D. very similar to that made by MARROW in the previous year.

The explanation may be that the Enemy was concerned mainly to maintain our confidence in the Phase A organization, and yet not to arouse our suspicions by giving a view of the G.D. opposed to that of MARROW.

(b) The story of ANTON de WILDE, which emerges from this traffic, is fully set out in Appendix IV, which contains a summary of the facts, and an extract from the Interrogation at Dagswater on 5.VII.43 by myself of JACQUES & MARCEL, with whom ANTON under the pseudonym of ADRIAN was twice in contact in Paris, and who was present at ANTON's arrest outside the restaurant des Capucines on 9.VI.43. This story is one of the most difficult features of this case. I am quite satisfied both that MARCEL is genuine, and that his account of the events on 9.VI.43 is a correct, further his description of ANTON is not inconsistent with that sent over the KALE traffic, which is wholly inconsistent with the description of the German Agent NICOLAS de WILDE. It is clear therefore that a Dutchman, who was not NICOLAS de WILDE, was sent out of Holland via the BROODREAR GOLF line at a time when that line is assumed to have been in Enemy hands, was arrested, whether genuinely or not, in Paris, and has not been heard of by J.C.E. again. When on 14 and 16.VI.43 KALE was informed by H.Q. of ANTON's arrest, told to break all contact with him, and asked whether ANTON had ever been arrested before, he replied - 17.VI.43 - that ANTON had been living illegally to escape arrest for "assisting R.A.F. Pilots to fly" and that KALE was sure that ANTON would declare this as a reason for his attempt to escape from Holland.

(c) On 16.VI.43 H.Q. ordered KALE to return as he was urgently required for consultation, and informed him that BROODREAR was being instructed concerning a new route. KALE replied - 17.VI.43 - that he was preparing his departure for July and for an absence of some weeks.

On 4.VII.43 KALE was galled via NETBALL that MARROW had full authority in his absence, and, on 9.VII.43, that friends in Zealand had arranged for a motor lifeboat to transport him, as the journey through France took too long, and that he would start about 12.VII.43.

On 12.VII.43 a signal came from KALE via NETBALL that he was leaving the Mouth of the Schelde at H.M. midnight (12/13 VII) and would set course for Broadstairs, and that the boat made 7 knots in calm water. On 16.VII.43 MARROW, via NETBALL, signalled that KALE plus three companions had left at H.M. on the night of 14/15.VII.43.

In point of fact H.M. at the mouth of the Schelde was at 0400 15.VII.43. At first light 0500 Fighter Command, at J.C.E. request, had a patrol over the River. Visibility is reported by Controller 11 Group to have been "unlimited" - the strongest word used to denote clear visibility. There was no sign of any craft at all in the mouth of the river; subsequent Air Recon during the day also failed to make any contact with such a boat.

At first light the boat would have travelled 7 miles from its starting point and been easily seen in the visibility described. Had it been captured by the Enemy during the hour of darkness, it is hardly conceivable that MARROW, who signalled the departure, would not have known of it. In my view the reasonable inference is that the boat never left, and that the story of KALE's departure was a fabrication by the Enemy by which he very conveniently to himself "got rid" of KALE.

(14) CHIVE

This traffic is small. It started 15.I.43 and there is little significance in its contents, but the interesting thing about it is that it continued up to 6.X.43 long after CHIVE had escaped from the Concentration Camp (i.e. 29.VIII.43).

I do not think that the Enemy would have risked continuing this traffic, had he known that CHIVE had regained his liberty, and I think that the most reasonable explanation is that the Commandant of the Concentration Camp, who would be bound to confess to the escape of CHIVE and SPROUT, reported that they had been killed in the attempt to save his own skin.

15. There are many other indications in the traffic of the Phase A Agents, subsequent to the dates in paras 11 and 12, which, on the basis I have defined, show that the traffic was under control. It is not necessary to enumerate them in this Report, but I have notes of most of them if they are required.

16. SABOTAGE CIRCUITS

The appreciation of the position of these is far more difficult.

The three chief Sabotage Agents (which were those first in the Field) were CATARRH, LETUCE and TURNIP. Subsequently LEEK and PARSNIP were sent. All of these were independent Sabotage Organisers, to all of whom assistants were subsequently sent either by their own or other Reception Committees. With PARSNIP, CABBAGE, with LEEK, LACROSSE must also be considered. Of these CHIVE and SPROUT identified CATARRH as W/Operator, EHEZEZER, and LETUCE as W/Operator, TRUMPET, as being in the Concentration Camp, as well as GOLF who was sent to PARSNIP, and BROCCOLI and ENDIVE both sent to TURNIP.

17. The EHEZEZER traffic, which started on 4.I.42, about 7 weeks after his arrival with CATARRH, is quite normal throughout: its last signal being on 24.II.43. During 1942 it reported on 9.VIII.42 that WATERBRESS had been shot on his arrest in early July, and on 26.IX.42 that PARSLEY sent to CATARRH 24-IX) had been concussed on landing, and, on 4-X.42, that he had died.

On 17.II.43 the safe arrival of PARSLEY A and RADISH was announced.

On 7.IV.43 and 13.IV.43 EHEZEZER signalled reports from POTATO that SPINACH had been arrested on 2.IV.43 and that CABBAGE feared "treason out of Victory circles". Probably POTATO used EHEZEZER because SPINACH was his own W/Operator.

In fact the last Signal ever received from SPINACH was on the 2.IV.43, it was indecipherable and terminated in a long omission as if the hand of the Operator had fallen on the key. The full story of SPINACH is in Appendix V.

However EHEZEZER was certainly arrested at some time and his traffic thereafter continued under control. There is on the 7.V.43 a mention of SPROUT, known to have been arrested on landing to MARROW on 9.III.43; but the context does not entail any knowledge of SPROUT's location or activities by the transmitter. Otherwise there is no suspicious feature in the whole of this traffic.

In September 1943 COSTER & SOOGER was sent to Holland to contact CATARRE/RENEZER at an address of K.D. REEZER-CUPERUS, Olympia Pleas 69, Amsterdam, given by Signal of 27.VIII.43 by RENEZER as a place to which money could be sent. COSTER succeeded in contacting CUPERUS twice, once in the street and once at his apartment. CUPERUS flatly denied every having been in contact with London, COSTER became suspicious of him and returned via France and Spain. He was interrogated at Baywater on 18.XI.43.

But on 21.XI. RENEZER, then certainly under control, signalled that the address was still good. CUPERUS may have been a boîte aux lettres used by the Enemy only to receive money from us, and the reason that COSTER was not arrested may have been that it was not expected that we should send personnel there.

18. The PARSLEY traffic began on 2.IV.43 about 6 weeks after he had landed to CATARRE, and his last signal was on 5.XI.43.

It gives a lot of Military Intelligence, which has proved to be good, e.g. on 28.V.43, in answer to an enquiry from H.Q. he gave details of the locality of the 65th Division, Marine Infantry on the Island of Walcheren, and of their H.Q. in Goes, and on October 1943 he gave an accurate account of the damage done during the air attack on the Dornier Works at Flushing. None of the information given, however, was of particular importance, or of a nature which the Enemy would consider that we did not know already.

19. Escape Route Agents

Finally the traffic from the BROADBEAN/GOLF Escape Organisation is very difficult to assess.

These Agents went together to PARSNIP on 18.II.43 and first signalled on 24.III.43; the traffic is still continuing. GOLF was identified in the Concentration Camp by the two Agents who escaped as long ago as 29.VIII.43.

It was through this line that both ANTON and the Agent now in custody, SERGEANT, were passed from Holland to Belgium. Further APOLLO (STOKKERS) who was sent recently into the Field (18.X.43) and who had just (11.III.43) been reported to have arrived in Gibraltar, was passed by this line.

The salient features of this traffic are as follows:-

On 29.IV.43 H.Q. instructed BROADBEAN that KALB had a man wanted urgently, here and instructed BROADBEAN to get him to Paris.

In reply 30.IV.43 BROADBEAN stated that everything had been received from BILL, and that "ADRIEN" (i.e. ANTON) would be brought over.

On 5.VI.43 BROADBEAN stated that he was in touch with a very important circle, and that it would probably be necessary for it to send a representative to the U.K.

5.VI.43 H.Q. replied we should be interested to see him.

5.VI.43 BROADBEN reported he was in contact with Colonel KOPPERT, the "leading man of the O.D." and asked permission to send him with ANTON.

On 5.VII.43 BROADBEN stated that KALB himself was ready to start on the 10th.

On 6.VII.43 - The name of KOPPERT's representative is given as SERGEANT.

This man in fact arrived and has been interrogated both at Baywater and by M.I.5. He is now under arrest as a suspect, and will be subjected to further interrogation by M.I.5. His interrogation at Baywater is attached as Appendix VI.

On 12.VII.43 BROADBEN signalled that SERGEANT would probably be at his destination (i.e. Paris) on 15.VII.

SERGEANT himself says that he was passed across the Dutch/Belgian frontier on 12.VII.43 and went to Brussels, where he stayed with VAN VLIET, who is almost certainly a German Agent. At the Franco/Belgian border VAN VLIET himself handed SERGEANT over to ARNAUD. SERGEANT reached Madrid on the 29.VIII.43 and London on 9.IX.

31.VII - H.Q. informed BROADBEN that they wanted two men (PUMPKIN and STEAK reported by CUCUMBER on 29.VII as ANTON's successor) out; BROADBEN himself to come with the first man, ARNAUD with the second.

On 2.IX.43 BROADBEN reported he had contacted PUMPKIN and would leave with him to-morrow.

Thereafter the traffic is carried on supposedly by GOLF (then certainly under arrest) alone.

On 10.IX.43 - GOLF reported that STEAK had started with ARNAUD's friends, and on 22.IX.43 that MANGOLD and CUCUMBER were leaving with ARNAUD's assistant that day for France.

During SERGEANT's interrogation here, enquiries were made of GOLF by H.Q., to which he replied:

13.X.43 - that he knew nothing of SERGEANT, as all had been arranged by BROADBEN; that KOPPERT was unknown to him; and that VAN VLIET was a collaborator of ARNAUD in Belgium, was not attached to any organisation "but had far-reaching relations" and knew KOPPERT "only from conversations concerning SERGEANT's journey".

This is quite inconsistent with SERGEANT's own story that it was VAN VLIET who persuaded him to go to the U.K.

On 16.X.43 GOLF advised that ARNAUD's assistant had left 22.IX.43 "with two friends".

On 19.X.43 - H.Q. advised that APOLLO (STOKKERS) and HEUTUS (COOR) had left for the Field on the night of the 18/19.X. but that the aircraft had not returned.

These were two Agents who were dropped blind in Belgium with the mission of making their way over the Belgian/Dutch frontier and contacting the Clandestine Press. As in other occupied territory, this form of subversive activity is the most and the least penetrated in Holland.

/successful

21.X.43 - GOLF replied that so far he had no news, but had sent an assistant to Brussels to investigate.

On 24.X.43 H.Q. advised that BROADBEAN had been arrested by "soldiers in mountains", i.e. Pyrenees.

This information had come from the VIC Escape Line, which had stated the four Dutchmen had been arrested in the Pyrenees. H.Q. took this to mean BROADBEAN, TENNIS, PUMPKIN and GOLF. It is an extremely puzzling feature, as there is every reason to believe that the VIC Line is not controlled; however VIC himself recently arrived in this country and may be able to throw light on this incident.

On 25.X.43 GOLF reported contact with BRUTUS, who stated that the aircraft had crashed near Golen, and that the pilot had been killed. BRUTUS had become separated from APOLLO and had lost all his gear. He had, however, made contact with Brussels and required immediate orders. And on 27.X. BRUTUS' arrival in Holland was reported by GOLF.

On 29.X.43 GOLF advised that APOLLO had just arrived.

On 2.XI.43 - GOLF sent an urgent signal from BRUTUS that it was desperately imperative that APOLLO return to the U.K. as he had information of paramount importance.

The position therefore was that both APOLLO and BRUTUS had been in contact with the operator of a set, whose operator sent out from this country is known at that time to have been under arrest. Nevertheless an Agent who is undoubtedly APOLLO is now in Gibraltar awaiting return to this country.

H.Q. on 4.XI.43 gave GOLF a Paris address for APOLLO:

Miss FREDIN
12, rue Poelst,
Vaugirard,
PARIS.

And on 7.XI.43 H.Q. warned GOLF of VAN VLIET, and advised his elimination.

According to GOLF's signal of 10.XI.43, APOLLO left for Paris on 6.XI. GOLF also stated he was extremely disconcerted to hear about VAN VLIET who had "serviced" APOLLO in Brussels.

This therefore is a second contact between APOLLO and a known Enemy Agent.

On 13.XI. GOLF signalled that ARNAUD refused to return, as he alone knew the connections to France, and did not see the necessity for his journey. Further "he also knows the percentage of blanks and prizes of such an enterprise and has an aversion to going the same way as others"; also he could not afford to abandon his lucrative private business.

On the same day H.Q. replied that they quite understood, and asked GOLF to send another man, who could be briefed here and return immediately.

On 14.XI. GOLF sent a most significant signal:

"As result investigations must say suspicious VAN VLIET absolutely unintelligible STOP great patriot and best comrade but somewhat exaggerating pompous fellow STOP formerly supported O.D. but left that organisation after bad experience Good Bye".

On 17.XI.43 ARHAUD appears to have changed his mind, because GOLF now suggests a meeting between ARHAUD and an S.O.E. emissary in Spain.

On 19.XI.43 GOLF reported that BRUTUS' friends had asked the Line to pass a U.S.A.A.F. Officer, Captain Hurst, No. 6793742, and that he had been conducted to Brussels.

This officer has been identified as John Kenard Hurst.

The traffic from GOLF ends with an urgent appeal for money, especially Belgian.

It must be added that a message purporting to come from BRUTUS has been transmitted via S.I.S. stating that he was suspicious of his W/Operator, i.e. GOLF. I have not seen this, but have been informed of it verbally.

I have set out this traffic in considerable detail, as it is very perplexing: if it is Enemy controlled, it is extremely well conceived.

20. Finally, a significant corroboration of the suspicion that there has been a wholesale capture of the S.O.E. Dutch Organisations in the Field comes from S.I.S.

On 23.VI.43 a message was passed to S.O.E. said to have come over the O.D. W/T Line:

"For Colonel de Bruyne eight parachutists including DOULIN and BURKE were arrested weeks ago. Code key-word 'Friend Marius' is known".

Further information was requested via S.I.S. and the reply, telephoned by Captain Seymour was:

"Information received from Haaren. Regret no further information available".

The actual text, which was seen much later by S.O.E. in Col. de Bruyne's office, to whom it had been passed by Captain Seymour, was:

"Information received from Haaren. This should be sufficient for Col. de Bruyne. Regret no further information available".

On 21.VII.43 Captain Seymour informed Major Bingham that a further message had been received from Switzerland by S.I.S.:

"Reliable Source recently arrived from Holland states on March 9th eight parachutists including a woman came down in Holland, but were immediately captured by the Enemy and put into prison at Haaren. One of these gave away Source and password which is 'I am friend of Marius'".